was a lack of system in its efforts, and much time and labor were thrown away. Not only were the President and the members of the cabinet unfamiliar with matters of military organization, but the man on whom they and everybody else naturally relied, the famous General Winfield Scott, was now too old and too firmly fixed in his ideas to render to the country the services which he earnestly desired to render. Even for him, with the experience of fifty years of active service, embracing as it did two wars, in each of which he had played a conspicuous part, the crisis presented features entirely novel, lie had had to do in his military career mainly with regular troops, and with small bodies only of these, lie had never commanded more than twelve or fifteen thousand men in his life, lie had, it is true, commanded volunteers, and he had done with them as well as he could. But lie had relied on his regulars. Now, however, it was plain to every one that the volunteers must constitute the main dependence of the country. The regular army was too small to count for much—that is, as a body of£ troops. The vital question at this time was how to transform the volunteers into a disciplined and formidable army; and this was, not only for President Lincoln and his

advisers, but alao for the veteran lieutenant-general himself, a new and untried question, and one of which, as we have said, he, unfortunately, was not able to take a vigorous hold.

For instance, the militia and volunteer regiments[1]

[1] The militia regiments were tho.se which, forming a part of the militia **forces** of the different States, haul been furnished to the Government in **re***